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Abstract
This paper discusses how to deal with low-valued recyclable residual wastes whose
reprocessing itself does not pay financially. While such a recycling activity can poten-
tially improve the social welfare if the environmental costs associated with its disposal
are suciently significant, governmental policies to promote recycling may be taken
advantage of and lead to even more harmful consequences, such as illegal dumping.
By constructing a model that includes both disposal and recycling activities and, fur-
thermore, by explicitly considering the government’s monitoring cost in preventing
firms from disposing of collected wastes illicitly, we identify the second-best deposit-
refund (D-R) policy for a low-valued recyclable. Our results indicate, however, that in
implementing such a policy a policy-maker has to face critical informational issues,
which is in stark contrast to the D-R policy for a non-low-valued recyclable.
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1 Introduction
In the presence of a household’s incentive to illegally dispose of its waste, a so-called
“two-part instrument (2PI)” or “deposit-refund (D-R) scheme” is considered to be a more
eective policy tool over others.1 To the best of our knowledge, however, most of the pre-
vious studies have not paid close attention to the possibility that commercially-transacted
recyclable residual wastes do not actually get recycled and, instead, illegally disposed by
firms.2 Illegal disposal can be a profitable option to firms when the government provides
a subsidy for simply obtaining wastes in a recycling market.
Ino (2011) examines the implications of such illicit behaviors by firms in determining
the optimal policy levels, and finds that the two-part instrument is still reasonably eective
as long as the net private benefit of recycling is positive, at least, up to a certain extent.
However, this condition does not always hold in reality. While the recycling of containers
and packaging have recently seen increasing governmental involvement in the forms of
taxes and subsidies in some developed countries, recycled materials from used PET bot-
tles and glass containers currently have very small economic values, as opposed to, say,
aluminum cans. These low-valued recyclables may get recycled solely due to the presence
of these policies, and the mere fact of private firms’ participating in residual waste trades
does not imply that the recycling is socially desirable. Indeed, by carefully estimating the
net social benefit of recycling household solid wastes, Kinnaman et al. (2014) report that
the welfare-maximizing recycling rates would be well below the observed and mandated
recycling rates for Japan and perhaps for other developed nations as well.
Moreover, when the recycled materials have very low economic values, this potential
“over-encouragement” of recycling can easily lead to firms’s illegal disposal of wastes that
are initially intended for recycling. In Japan, for instance, numerous midnight dumping
cases of cleansed and properly-sorted PET bottles in large chunks have been reported in the
1Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995) and Palmer and Walls (1997) are seminal works in this literature. Fuller-
ton and Wolverton (2005) show its eectiveness in a more general context.
2On the other hand, illegal disposal by households has been carefully examined by Fullerton and Kinna-
man (1995) and Choe and Frazer (1999), for instance.
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news media since the implementation of the Law for the Promotion of Sorted Collection
and Recycling of Containers and Packaging (or, Container and Packaging Recycling Law,
in short) in 1997. Given the typical volumes of those wastes, it is obvious that they were
discarded by firms and not by households. The law is intended to make the manufacturers
of packaging and the retailers of packaged products financially responsible for the disposal
of the packaging wastes and also to encourage the recycling of those wastes by providing
extra monetary incentives for recyclers. It is considered, however, that some recyclers have
taken advantage of the law and received illegitimate financial benefits for the recycling
activities they have not conducted properly.
On the other hand, it is not necessarily the case that such “low-valued recycling” is
inecient from a society’s perspective, especially when the disposal cost of the waste is
large. Recycling can be justified on the social welfare ground even if a recycled material
per se has a fairly low market value. In this paper, we attempt to derive the optimal policy
set under the condition that the recycled material has such a small market value that makes
the net private benefit of recycling negative for a recycler. Then, based on the structure of
this optimal policy, we discuss why it is considerably more dicult to actually implement
the second-best deposit-refund policy for a low-valued recyclable product.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes our economic model,
and Section 3 derives the second-best policy set. The following section discusses the
reason why, in the case of low-valued recyclables, it is dicult, especially on the infor-
mational grounds, for a policy-maker to implement the second-best policy without over-
encouraging recycling activities which results in the creation of a socially inecient recy-
cling market and the illegal waste disposal.
2 The Model
We essentially adopt a modified version of the partial equilibrium model in Ino (2011),
which includes both the product and recyclable residual waste markets. The proper com-
pletion of recycling requires the reprocessing eorts by households, such as cleansing,
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sorting-out and storing the wastes, as well as by firms. For simplicity, we consider only
one representative household, and one representative firm which plays the roles of both a
recycler and a producer.3 The household and the firm are supposed to be price-takers.
We assume that one unit of the product generates one unit of recyclable waste after
consumption. The authorities provide the legal waste collection service for the household,
and the unit charge for this service equals h 2 R+. Potentially, the household can dispose
of its residual wastes illegally to avoid this unit charge. In order to mitigate such an
incentive, the authorities can monitor illegal disposal activities by the household, besides
providing the legal waste collection service. With suciently high levels of monitoring
and fines, the household will not resort to illicit disposal options even when there is some
positive unit charge on legal disposal. If the marginal social cost of the illegally disposed
waste is greater than that of legally disposed one as we assume in this paper4, such a level
of monitoring is optimal from the viewpoint of social welfare maximization. Indeed, we
can show that under our optimal policy set all the waste disposal by the household ends up
being conducted legally.5 Then, the following simple material balance condition applies:
z = xd   rs, where z is the amount of waste legally disposed by the household, xd the
household’s demand for the product, and rs the household’s supply of the recyclable waste
to the firm. We consider the case where xd > 0 and rs  0 (hence, the boundary case
of zero recycling by the household is allowed). Moreover, to facilitate the analysis, we
assume rs < xd; that is, we exclude the case where z is zero.6
With the use of a quasi-linear utility function, we assume that the representative house-
hold’s behavior is approximated by the following constrained utility maximization prob-
lem with respect to xd, rs, and a numeraire, y:
max
xd ;rs;y
U(xd) + y; (1)
3All the results and implications of this paper can be extended to an economy with m  1 firms and n  1
households and also to the case where recyclers and output producers are separate entities.
4This assumption is also adopted by Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995) and Choe and Frazer (1999).
5For the formal analysis including the proof of this fact, see Ino (2011).
6This assumption let us focus on a realistic case where, with currently available recycling technologies,
it is not socially optimal to attain zero waste disposal.
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s.t. Pxxd + y + h(xd   rs) +Cr(rs)  I + Prrs; (2)
where I is the household’s income, Px 2 R++ the price of the product, and Pr 2 R the
price of the recyclable waste.7 Also, U : R+ 7! R signifies the sub-utility function of
the household, which is strictly increasing and strictly concave, and Cr(rs) : R+ 7! R+
is a strictly increasing and strictly convex cost function associated with the household’s
separation and other activities that are necessary for proper recycling by the firm later.8
Then, the first-order conditions give us the household’s inverse demand function for
the product and its inverse supply function of the recyclable residual wastes, respectively:
Px(xd; h) = U0(xd)   h; (3)
Pr(rs; h) = C0r(rs)   h; (4)
for all xd > 0 and rs  0. Here, we define Pr(0; h)  limrs!0 Pr(rs; h) = C0r(0)   h.
The representative firm produces a recyclable product with some technology that is
represented by a strictly increasing and strictly convex cost function, Cx(xs) : R+ 7! R+,
where xs is the firm’s supply of the product. The firm also demands the recyclable house-
hold wastes by the amount of rd. After the firm obtains the residual wastes, it might
illegally dispose of the wastes, instead of recycling them properly. We denote the amount
of the firm’s illegal waste disposal by z f , and rc is the quantity of residual wastes that
are completely reprocessed by the firm. Again, we suppose a simple material balance
condition for the firm as well: z f = rd   rc.
The firm’s net benefit of proper recycling is given by a strictly concave function, B(rc) :
R+ 7! R. Note that we allow the value of B(rc) to be negative since it contains the cost
of reprocessing the residual wastes.9 Indeed, in order to focus on the issues arising when
7When Pr > 0 (Pr < 0), the firm (household) pays in the recyclable residual market. Note that Pr can be
negative because the household may still be willing to pay in order to avoid the charge for waste disposal.
8Kinnaman et al. (2014) empirically estimate the recycling cost to households.
9In our model, B(rc) is given exogenously, and it can be interpreted in several dierent ways. Here, B(rc)
is defined as B0(rc) = p  C0(rc), where p is the exogenously given price of the recycled material and C0(rc)
is the reprocessing cost. If the firm sells its recycled material in some other market, p is simply the market
price of the material. If the firm uses the recycled material as an input for its own production, p is the price
of a perfectly substitutable virgin input, v, provided that the production function of the good x is of the form
x = f (r + v).
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the recycled material has fairly low economic value, we assume below that B0(0)  0.10
Furthermore, we suppose that limr!1 B0(r) =  1.
By choosing the stringency of their monitoring activities, the authorities essentially
control the expected unit penalty on the firm’s illegal disposal,  f 2 R+. The level of
the expected penalty is determined by multiplying the unit penalty by the probabilities
of detecting illegal disposal activities. Raising the probability of detection requires more
patrol eorts, which leads to an increase in the monitoring cost. We suppose that it costs
the authorities   f ( f ) : R+ 7! R+ to monitor the firm’s disposal activities. On the other
hand, their cost of monitoring the household’s illegal waste disposal is given by  h(h) :
R+ 7! R+. This cost is a function of a unit charge on its legal disposal because a higher
disposal charge requires a higher level of monitoring on the household so as to achieve
zero illegal disposal there.11 Both  h and   f are strictly increasing and convex functions.
As additional policy tools, we consider two policy instruments which could be called
a “deposit-refund (D-R)” scheme in combination: the tax t 2 R (deposit) in the product
market and the subsidy s 2 R (refund) in the residual waste market. The total tax and
subsidy amounts are proportional to the quantities of the market-exchanged product and
its residual wastes, xs and rd, respectively. As an important assumption, we suppose that
the subsidy on the commercially-transacted residual wastes is provided without knowing
exactly how much of them the firm will eventually reprocess into recycled materials. Al-
though the market-based information on the firm (that is, xs in the product market, and rd
in the recyclable residual waste market) is available and verifiable for the policy maker,
the amount of residual wastes actually reprocessed by the firm, i.e., rc; cannot be observed
because this constitutes the firm’s private information.12 Therefore, the firm might surrep-
10The case where B0(0) > 0 is analyzed in Ino (2011).
11As is mentioned above, zero illegal disposal by the household is always optimal from the society’s
viewpoint.
12Thus, we suppose that the total amount of the transacted residual wastes, rd, which is observable in the
recycling market, is separated into two unobservable variables, illegally disposed wastes, z f , and properly
reprocessed ones, rc, according to the material balance equation, rd = z f + rc. In the terms typically found in
the environmental economics literature, rd and rc respectively correspond to the reported and actual levels
of emission abatement while z f is the level of cheating by the firm. While in this paper we adopt the notion
that the authorities attempt to detect the cheating by directly monitoring the firm’s illicit activity, z f can
also be identified indirectly by observing its legal activity, rc, in the light of the material balance equation.
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titiously get rid of its obtained residual wastes and pretend to have reprocessed the wastes
properly.
Finally, the waste disposal activities of both the household and the firm, i.e., z and z f ,
respectively generate constant marginal social costs of d 2 R++ and d f 2 R++, including
the cost associated with certain environmental damages. Since illegal disposal, such as
midnight dumping and illicit burning, would typically be socially more costly than legal
disposal options, such as controlled landfills and proper incineration, we assume d < d f .
Then, the social welfare function W is defined as
W [U(xd)   Pxxd] + [Prrs  Cr(rs)]   hz (5)
+ [(Px   t)xs  Cx(xs)] + [B(rc)   (Pr   s)rd]    f z f (6)
+ hz +  f z f + txs   srd    h(h)     f ( f )   dz   d f z f : (7)
Here, (5) and (6) are the consumer surpluses and the producer surpluses, respectively.
Note that the second brackets of (5) and (6) are the surpluses related to the reprocess-
ing/recycling activities, and the third terms are the payments associated with waste dis-
posal. Finally, (7) signifies the sum of the authorities’ tax and fine revenues, subsidy and
monitoring costs, and the social costs associated with waste disposal. With the two market
clearing conditions, i.e., xd = xs and rd = rs, we can rewrite the social welfare W simply
as
W = [U(xd)  Cr(rs)   dz] + [B(rc)  Cx(xs)   d f z f ]    h(h)     f ( f ): (8)
Indeed, our model can also be used to depict the latter case, where   f is now interpreted as the monitoring
cost on the firm’s proper recycling eorts. Even in such a case, we argue that, typically, it is not costless
to trace the whole recycling processes for the following reasons. First, the residual wastes of one product
can be reprocessed into a variety of recycled materials by dierent firms, which implies that it would be
dicult to verify the actual usage of recycled materials. Second, the recycled materials are often mixed
with some virgin materials in the production process, which suggests that it is not costless to identify the
actual ratio of recycled materials used. Third, the firm may internally use the recycled materials in its own
production, which implies that the market-based information on the exact usage of recycled materials may
not be available. If it is extremely easy to trace the whole recycling processes in spite of these facts, that is,
if   f is infinitesimally small, our model becomes close to the first-best situation (see Footnote 18).
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3 The Optimal Policy Set
We solve the optimal policy choice problem in steps. First, given the policy variables,
(t; s;  f ; h), we derive the market equilibrium. Then, we find the monitoring level that
achieves zero illegal disposal by the firm. In particular, we call such a monitoring level
as the “optimal monitoring rule.” As we will see below in Lemma 1, this is admissible in
deriving the optimal policy set due to the assumption that the illegal waste disposal by the
firm is always socially more costly than the legal waste disposal by the household. Thus,
we can focus our attention on the equilibrium quantities and prices that are induced under
the optimal monitoring rule. Finally, we obtain the second-best policy set that maximizes
the social welfare.
3.1 Behavior of the Firm and the Market Equilibrium
The profit maximization problem of the firm is given by
max
xs;rc;rd ;z f
[(Px   t)xs  Cx(xs)] + [B(rc)    f z f   (Pr   s)rd]
s.t. rd = z f + rc:
(9)
Then, the first-order conditions are
Px = Cx0(xs) + t; (10)
B0(rc)   with equality if rc > 0; (11)
  Pr   s with equality if rd > 0; (12)
  f   with equality if z f > 0; (13)
where  is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the constraint. Presuming xs > 0,
(10) gives the inverse supply function of the product.
For the time being, let us suppose that both s and  f are exogenously given. From (11)
– (13) and the constraint, the demand correspondence for the recyclable waste, i.e., rd, is
described as follows.
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When (i) B0(0)    f , the demand is
rd(Pr; s;  f ) =
8>>><>>>:
0 if Pr  s + B0(0);
B0 1(Pr   s) if s + B0(0)  Pr  s    f ;
[rˆ( f );1) if Pr = s    f ;
(14)
where rˆ( f ) = B0 1(  f ). Thus, rˆ( f ) is the residual wastes’ amount where the net
marginal benefit of proper recycling, s + B0, which can be derived from (11) and (12),
equals the net marginal benefit of illicit disposal for the firm, s    f , which can be derived
from (12) and (13). When (ii)   f > B0(0), on the other hand, the demand correspondence
is
rd(Pr; s;  f ) =
(
0 if Pr  s    f ;
[rˆ( f );1) if Pr = s    f ; (15)
where rˆ( f ) = 0. For the respective cases, the demand curves in the residual waste market
are drawn in bold lines in Figure 1, where Pr(r; h) = C0r   h denotes the inverse supply
curve given by (4).
Figure 1: (i)B0(0) >   f , (ii)  f  B0(0)
Pr(r; h)
r
Pr
rd(Pr; s;  f )
s + B0(r)
s + B0(0)
s    f
rc + z frc
rˆ
r
Pr
rd(Pr; s;  f )
s + B0(r)
s + B0(0)
s    f
rc + z frc
rˆ
(i) (ii)
Pr(r; h)
Pr(s; h)
Pr(s; h)
A
A
0
E
E
E’
E’
The equilibrium outcomes are determined by the intersections of the demand and sup-
ply curves in the product and residual waste markets. In the waste market, the equilibrium
is given by the point E in Figure 1. Since s + B0(r) is the net marginal benefit of proper
recycling, and s    f is the net marginal benefit of illegal disposal, the wastes that are
obtained by the firm are completely recycled when rd  rˆ( f ), whereas the firm disposes
of its wastes by the amount which exceeds rˆ( f ) when rd > rˆ( f ). In Figure 1, the recycled
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amount of the waste is represented by the segment to the left of the kinked point A, while
the illegally disposed amount is given by the segment to the right of A until it hits the
supply curve at the point E. Particularly, in case (ii), all the transacted wastes eventually
end up being disposed illegally by the firm.
3.2 The Optimal Monitoring Rule
Let zf (t; s;  f ; h) be the equilibrium level of the firm’s illegal disposal under a policy set
(t; s;  f ; h), then we can obtain the following result:
Lemma 1. When zf (t; s;  f ; h) > 0 for a given policy set, there exists an alternative policy
set that improves welfare.
Proof. See the Appendix. Q.E.D.
Thanks to this lemma, in deriving the optimal set of policies, we can exclude the cases
where the firm illegally disposes of the residual wastes it has obtained, and focus on the
monitoring level that achieves zf = 0. In order to prevent any illegal disposal, the author-
ities basically need to maintain the monitoring level suciently high. In addition, they
should select the lowest among such sucient monitoring levels to save on the monitoring
cost. Specifically, the authorities should maintain the monitoring eorts at a level that is
high enough to satisfy the optimal monitoring rule ˆ f (s; h) defined by
ˆ f (s; h) =
(
s   Pr(s; h) if s > Pr(s; h);
0 if s  Pr(s; h); (16)
where Pr(s; h) is the equilibrium price of the residual wastes that is induced under the
condition that illegal disposal from the firm is zero; that is, Pr(s; h)  Pr(r(s; h); h),
where r(s; h) is such an amount of the residual wastes that satisfies
Pr(r(s; h); h) = B0(r(s; h)) + s; (17)
if Pr(0; h) < B0(0) + s, and r(s; ) = 0 if Pr(0; h)  B0(0) + s. Note that the left-
hand side of (17) is inverse supply of residual wastes and the right-hand side of that is the
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marginal benefit of proper recycling. Thus, (17) is the market clearing condition under
proper recycling and identifies the equilibrium point where there is no illegal disposal,
which is shown by the point E’ in Figure 1.
When s > Pr as in the first line of (16), the subsidy for transacted residual wastes
is higher than the price if the firm is properly engaged in recycling. Hence, the firm
has the incentive to purchase the residual wastes further and dispose of them illegally
after pocketing the subsidy. To remove this incentive, the expected penalty on illegal
disposal should completely oset the subsidy-price margin, s   Pr , as is stated in the
optimal monitoring rule. When s  Pr as in the second line of (16), since the subsidy-
price margin is negative, the firm does not have the incentive to purchase the residual
wastes solely for the sake of illegal disposal and thus, the optimal monitoring level is
zero.13 As a result, when  f = ˆ f (s; h), the firm’s illegal disposal zf is zero and thus
the equilibrium amount of the recycled wastes is r(s; h). It then follows that, under the
optimal monitoring rule, the equilibrium amount of legally disposed household’s wastes is
z(t; s; h) = x(t; h)   r(s; h), where x(t; h) represents the equilibrium amount of the
product that is given by (3) and (10):
Px(x(t; h); h) = Cx0(x(t; h)) + t: (18)
Now, we can identify the following two key threshold levels of the subsidy, s¯ and sˆ,
for the firm. The threshold s¯ is the smallest amount of the subsidy that could induce the
firm to recycle the wastes properly, provided that its incentive to dispose of the wastes
illicitly is suciently curtailed. The threshold sˆ is the largest subsidy level under which
no monitoring cost incurs.
Lemma 2. (i) r(s; h) = 0 if and only if s  s¯  Pr(0; h)   B0(0) = C0r(0)   h   B0(0).
(ii) ˆ f (s; h) = 0 if and only if s  sˆ  Pr(0; h) = C0r(0)   h.
13Under the optimal monitoring rule, point A in Figure 1 is exactly on the supply curve of the residual
wastes at Pr (s; h) when ˆ f > 0 and below the supply curve when ˆ f = 0. Thus, when  f , ˆ f , the
authorities can improve the welfare by eliminating the firm’s illegal disposal (when  f < ˆ f ) or by saving on
the monitoring cost (when  f > ˆ f ). It is important to note that the optimal monitoring rule works as well
even if r = 0 (Pr(0; h)  B0(0) + s) since Pr (s; h) = Pr(0; h) = C0r(0)   h.
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Proof. (i) It immediately follows from the definition of r(s; ) that r(s; h) = 0 if and
only if Pr(0; h)  B0(0) + s; or equivalently, s  Pr(0; h)   B0(0). (ii) First, consider
the case where s  Pr(0; h)   B0(0). In this case, we have r(s; h) = 0. This implies
that Pr(s; h) = Pr(0; h). Thus, ˆ f (s; h) > 0 if and only if s > Pr(s; h) = Pr(0; h)
by the definition of (16). Next consider the case where s > Pr(0; h)   B0(0). In this
case, s > Pr(0; h) is always obtained by B0(0)  0. Furthermore, in this case, we have
r(s; h) > 0. Hence, Pr(s; h) = B0(r(s; h)) + s. Since B0(r(s; h)) < 0, it follows that
Pr(s; h) < s and thus ˆ f (s; h) > 0 by the definition of (16). Q.E.D.
Because we suppose B0(0)  0, sˆ  s¯ always holds (with strict inequality if B0(0) < 0).
Therefore, when sˆ < s  s¯, as is seen in the case where s = s0 in Figure 2, both r(s; h) = 0
and ˆ f (s; h) > 0 are satisfied. In such a situation,14 even though the residual waste market
does not exist, the authority must conduct some monitoring on the firm because, without
monitoring ( f = 0), the waste market emerges and all the wastes obtained by the firm
are illegally discarded (i.e., all the traded residual wastes of the amount A are disposed of
illegally).
Figure 2: Thresholds in the subsidy levels
r
Pr
B0(r) + Pr(0; h)
Pr(0; h) + B0(0)
s0
Pr(r; h)
B0(r)
B0(0)
B0(r) + Pr(0; h)   B0(0)
sˆ = Pr(0; h)
B0(r) + s0
s¯ = Pr(0; h)   B0(0)
0
A
14Observe that in the figure, the marginal benefit of illegal disposal s0 intersects the supply curve of the
residual wastes Pr(r; h), but the marginal benefit of proper recycling B0(r) + s0 does not.
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3.3 The Optimal Policy Set
Given the optimal monitoring rule and the resulting equilibrium outcomes, we now pro-
ceed to the final step, where we determine the optimal policy set (t; s; h; f ) so as to
maximize the social welfare under the condition f = ˆ f (s; h). The welfare maximiza-
tion problem is formally described as:
max
t;s;h
W(t; s; h)  [U(x(t; h))  Cr(r(s; h))] + [B(r(s; h))  Cx(x(t; h))]
  d[x(t; h)   r(s; h)]    h(h)     f (ˆ f (s; h)): (19)
The solution to this problem gives us the second-best policy set.15 First, we show that
the authorities should not charge the household for the waste disposal service.
Proposition 1. Under the optimal policy set, the authorities always set h = 0.
Proof. See the Appendix. Q.E.D.
For obtaining the optimal policy set, therefore, we can focus on the case where h = 0.
Henceforth, we omit h from the arguments unless it is necessary.
Second, we show that the optimal product tax (or, the deposit on a unit of the product)
is equal to the marginal social cost of the legally disposed wastes by the household.
Proposition 2. Under the optimal policy set, the authorities always set t = d.
Proof. See the Appendix. Q.E.D.
The next step is to derive the optimal subsidy level with h = 0 and t = d. To solve
the problem (19) with respect to s, we divide the situation into the following two cases
depending on whether the residual waste market emerges or not (note that Pr(0; 0) =
C0r(0)).
15We assume that the appropriate second-order conditions with respect to (t; s) are globally met when
x > 0 and r > 0.
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Proposition 3. If r(s; 0) > 0 under the optimal policy set, the subsidy level is given by
s = sM, which satisfies sM = d   A(sM), where16
A(sM)   B00(r(sM; 0)) 0f (sM   Pr(sM; 0)) > 0:
If r(s; 0) = 0 under the optimal policy set, the optimal subsidy is any s that satisfies
s  C0r(0).
Proof. See the Appendix. Q.E.D.
Finally, we show the condition under which the emergence of the recycling market is
socially desirable. Along with the definition of the optimal monitoring rule in the previous
subsection and the optimal subsidy levels described in the proposition just above, this
condition gives us the threshold level of d that distinguishes between dierent patterns for
monitoring the firm as a part of optimal policy set.
Proposition 4. There exists ¯d  s¯ + A(s¯) (with equality if and only if B0(0) = 0)17 such
that r(s; 0) > 0 under the optimal policy if and only if d > ¯d. Thus, the optimal expected
penalty on the firm is f = sM   Pr(sM; 0) > 0 if d > ¯d; and f = 0 if d  ¯d.
Proof. Choose the value of d that satisfies sM = s¯ = Cr0(0)   B0(0) and d = s¯ + A(s¯), and
denote it by d0, where
A(s¯)   B00(r(s¯)) 0f (s¯   Pr(s¯)) =  B00(0) 0f ( B0(0)):
since r(s¯) = 0 and Pr(s¯) = Pr(0) = C0r(0). Consider the case where d > d0. Then, sM > s¯
holds. This is because, if sM  s¯, d  d0 must hold since
d = sM + A(sM) = sM   B00(0) 0f (sM  C0r(0))  sM   B00(0) 0f ( B0(0))  d0:
16Note that, in finding the actual level of sM , we need to know A(sM), which includes the information that
is available only in the residual waste market because we have the relation:
B00 0f =
dPr
drd
 0f =
Pr 0f
r
 
dPr=Pr
drd=r
!
=
Pr 0f
rdr
;
where dr represents the elasticity of the demand for the residual wastes.
17As is in the proof, in order to induce ¯d, we must compare two locally maximized welfare levels,
W(d; sM) and W(d;C0r(0)). Thus, ¯d consists of the market information that is only available in the residual
waste market.
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as sM  s¯ and  00f  0. In this case, we must compare two locally maximized welfare
levels, W(d; sM) and W(d;C0r(0)) (see Figure 3). Due to the envelope theorem and the
fact that r(sM) > 0 as sM > s¯, we have @W(d; sM)=@d = r(sM)   x(d). Also from the
envelope theorem and the fact that r(C0r(0)) = 0 as C0r(0)  s¯, we have @W(d;C0r(0))=@d =
r(C0r(0))   x(d) =  x(d). Thus, (i) W(d; sM)   W(d;C0r(0)) is strictly increasing in
d > d0. Now take an arbitrary s such that s > s¯. Then, W(d; sM)  W(d; s) since s = sM
gives the local maximum in this range. Then, @(W(d; s)   W(d;C0r(0)))=@d = r(s) > 0,
where r(s) is constant for any d. Hence, if d is suciently large, (ii) there exists d > d0
such that W(d; sM)   W(d;C0r(0))  W(d; s)   W(d;C0r(0)) > 0. Furthermore, (iii)
W(d; sM)   W(d;C0r(0))  0 holds if d = d0 (with equality if and only if B0(0) = 0)
since W(d; s¯)  W(d;C0r(0)) (note that W(d; s) is decreasing in s when C0r(0) < s  s¯
as shown in the proof of Lemma 3). From (i)-(iii), there exists a value of ¯d  d0 such that
W(d; sM)   W(d;C0r(0)) > 0 if and only if d > ¯d, where ¯d = d0 if and only if B0(0) = 0.
Consider the case where d  d0. Then, W(d; s) is decreasing in s when s > s¯ since sM  s¯.
Therefore, under the optimal policy, s  C0r(0) and r(s) = 0. Q.E.D.
Figure 3: Welfare comparison
Cr0(0) Cr0(0) Cr0(0) Cr0(0) B0(0)  B0(0)s
M sM
W(d;Cr0(0)) W(d;Cr0(0))
W(d; sM)
W(d; sM)
s s
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cases d > ¯d otherwise
tax t t = d t = d
subsidy s s = d   A(sM) > C0r(0) s  C0r(0)
monitor  f f = sM   Pr(sM) > 0 f = 0
fee h h = 0 h = 0
recycling r r(s; h) > 0 r(s; h) = 0
Table 1: Optimal policy set and recycling
Propositions 1-4 gives us the second-best policy structure. For convenience, Table
1 summarizes the results of these propositions, and Figure 4 depicts the pattern of the
optimal tax and subsidy for the case where B0(0) < 0 and the case where B0(0) = 0,
respectively.
Figure 4: Pattern of the optimal policy: The left panel depicts the case where B0(0) < 0
and the right panel the case where B0(0) = 0
t; s
d
sˆ
sˆ
t
s
A(sM)
without with
monitoring
s¯ + A
s¯
no recycling
s¯ ¯d
t; s
d
s¯ = sˆ
sˆ
t
s
A(sM)
without with
monitoring
s¯ + A
no recycling
= s¯ = ¯d
The optimal policy set in the case where d > ¯d (the second column of Table 1 and
the right-hand region of each panel in Figure 4 that is denoted by “monitoring-with”) is
the system of imposing the tax on the product (deposit) for the full social cost of the legal
disposal, a somewhat reduced subsidy to the commercially transacted residual wastes (re-
fund), and free disposal service for legally disposed household waste to avoid conducting
any monitoring on the household. This is the D-R policy modified by taking into account
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the monitoring cost on the firm.18 Since the environmental damage d is suciently large
in this case, the authorities should encourage the firm to undertake recycling by providing
the appropriate amount of subsidy (s > sˆ: the optimal levels of subsidy should be on the
bold line of Figure 4) and implementing the necessary monitoring on the firm.
In the case where d  ¯d (the third column of Table 1 and the left-hand region of each
panel in Figure 4 that is denoted by “monitoring-without”), however, the environmental
damage d is small enough that the authorities should avoid incurring any monitoring cost
by simply abandoning the idea of creating a recycling market through policy interventions.
In particular, the authorities must keep the subsidy at a lower level than the one that re-
quires the monitoring (s  sˆ: the optimal levels of subsidy should be in the shaded area of
Figure 4). Since the optimal quantity of recycling is zero along with no monitoring at all,
only a tax on the product is actually implemented; that is, the optimal policy set becomes
the advanced disposal fee (or ADF) in this case.
4 Discussion
In the previous section, we find the second best policy combination for a low-valued re-
cyclable product and show that there are the two distinct types of optimal policy sets
depending on the level of environmental damage d: the D-R policy with monitoring that
gives birth to the waste market, and the ADF without monitoring that does not create the
recycling market. In this section, we further elaborating on this result and argue that, due
to the structure of the optimal policy set, these policies are by nature dicult to imple-
ment appropriately. One potential consequence is that it becomes quite plausible that the
government mistakenly creates the waste market when it should not. As a likely scenario
we focus on the case where the social cost of the legally disposed household wastes, i.e.,
d, gradually increases for certain reasons, such as the increasing shortage of waste dis-
posal sites and the gradual rise in the society’s environmental awareness, and discuss the
18When the monitoring cost for the firm is infinitesimally small, i.e.,  0f is almost zero everywhere, A(sM)
is also close to zero according to the composition of A(sM). In such a case, therefore, our second-best D-R
policy approximates the first-best D-R policy t = s = d.
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diculties that are involved in implementing the optimal policies we have proposed above.
If the monitoring cost on the firm is zero (hence, there is no monitoring issue concern-
ing the firm), it is true that the waste market should not emerge if and only if it does not
emerge with the first-best tax-subsidy policy, t = s = d.19 Thus, in this ideal case, just by
implementing this simple standard two-part policy instrument, the waste market emerges
when d reaches the level at which it should emerge. The authorities do not need to worry
about exactly when the waste market should be created.
In contrast, when there is a monitoring issue concerning the firm, the structure of the
second-best policy implies the following:
Corollary 1. The residual waste market should not emerge if but not only if it does not
emerge with the first-best tax-subsidy policy.
When d  ¯d, the waste market should not emerge in the second-best situation. How-
ever, there is a gap between the marginal social cost of the legally disposed household
wastes and the second-best subsidy level in the region where d exceeds sˆ (see Figure 4).
This is because if the subsidy is provided simply at the level of s = d, the authorities
must monitor the firm when d exceeds sˆ before d reaches s¯ (see Lemma 2). Otherwise,
the subsidy of the amount s = d induces the firm to participate in the waste market and
simply dispose of all the obtained waste illegally. In such a case, the first-best tax-subsidy
provision creates the waste market when it should not emerge. In other words, since s¯  sˆ
or B0(0) < 0 (see also the paragraph just below Lemma 2), an undesirable waste market
emerges. Thus, as regards the desirability of the recycling market, we need some other
criteria than this simple two-part instrument.
Remark 1 Even when there is a monitoring issue concerning the firm’s behavior, as long
as the recycled material has positive net economic value, at least, for certain initial units,
i.e., B0(0) > 0, Ino (2011) finds it true that zero recycling activity is socially desirable if
19Then, illegal disposal by the firm can be prevented, and no monitoring activity for the household is a
part of this first-best policy set, i.e., h = 0.
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and only if recycling activities does not arise with the subsidy of s = d.20 Hence, there is no
concern of creating a socially inecient waste market by over-encouraging the recycling
activities through this simple subsidy scheme. Thus, the above problem is a challenge
inherent only for low-valued recyclable products.
As the magnitude of d increases, the policy combination should shift from the ad-
vanced disposal fee to the D-R policy, according to the second-best policy set identified in
the previous section. In order to implement such a policy shift appropriately, the author-
ities need to know (i) the level of subsidy sM = d   A(sM) that should be included in the
D-R policy and (ii) the threshold level in the marginal social cost of the legal household
disposal, ¯d  s¯ + A(s¯), at which level the change in policy structures need to be under-
taken. However, these two critical values contain the information that can be obtained only
in the recycling market.21 In a sense, the authorities face a dilemma in implementing the
second-best policy: they need to give birth to the recycling market in order to obtain the
information that is necessary to know whether they should create the recycling market and
how they should do so. Indeed, the following particular feature of the second-best subsidy
scheme is the key property that makes this dilemma quite troublesome.
Corollary 2. When B0(0) < 0, the second-best subsidy level s is discontinuous at d = ¯d.
If B0(0) = 0, the dilemma may not be so serious as the case where B0(0) < 0. In
this case, sM approximates the threshold subsidy level which leads to the creation of the
desirable recycling market, i.e., s¯ = d   A(s¯), when d barely exceeds ¯d, and thus, the
second-best subsidy level is continuous at d = ¯d, as is seen in the right panel of Figure
4. This implies that the waste market first emerges in the minimal scale possible in im-
plementing the second-best policy. In this case, therefore, it is possible for the authorities
to induce a small recycling market experimentally and gather the necessary information
20See Proposition 2 in Ino (2011). This is because the smallest subsidy level that induces the proper
recycling s¯ is strictly smaller than the largest subsidy level that does not require the monitoring sˆ when
B0(0) > 0. Thus, before d reaches sˆ, the subsidy of s = d creates a proper recycling market without
monitoring.
21As we will see below, even then, the exact level of ¯d is not yet known if B0(0) < 0.
19
to find the value of A(s¯) without a serious welfare loss.22 Moreover, the threshold for the
policy shift is exactly at ¯d = s¯ + A(s¯) (Proposition 4). Hence, when A(s¯) is estimated, ¯d
can be identified by the same market information.
However, when the recycled material is suciently “low-valued” in the sense that
B0(0) < 0, the second-best subsidy level discontinuously jumps up at d = ¯d as is seen
in the left panel of Figure 4. This implies that the waste market should suddenly reach a
substantial scale as soon as it is launched. Thus, an experimental policy shift could carry a
high risk of substantial welfare loss. Furthermore, the threshold social cost for the policy
switch is ¯d > s¯ + A(s¯) when B0(0) < 0 (see Proposition 4). The market information that
is necessary to find ¯d is no longer coincides with the information that is necessary to find
sM. This structure of the optimal policy itself renders the authorities quite clueless over
whether the creation of the waste market is desirable or not. We might as well call this
“the curse of low-valued recycling”.23
Remark 2 Let us interpret this result more intuitively. When B0(0) < 0, proper recycling
activities by the firm never start without the authorities’ monitoring on the firm’s illegal
disposal. The fact that B0(0) < 0 means that the reprocessing is always unprofitable per
se. Thus, in order to prevent transacted residual wastes from being disposed illegally by
the firm, the monitoring level must be raised suciently high to discourage the firm from
obtaining the wastes in the first place. On the other hand, when r = 0, the authorities
do not need to monitor the firm and incur the associated monitoring cost. Hence, once
the recycling market is created, the authorities are suddenly burdened with substantial
monitoring costs. In order to claim that recycling should be encouraged in the presence
of the monitoring costs, the social benefits of recycling must be large enough to satisfy:
22Since s¯ = Pr(0) is the market price when the recycling is minimal, the required market information A(s¯)
can be obtained once the smallest recycling market emerges.
23When B0(0) > 0, this “curse” is perfectly avoided. Since we have s¯ < sˆ in this case, the proper recycling
market has already emerged before the monitoring issue arises at d = sˆ. Thus, the policy-maker does not
need to consider the monitoring problem alongside with the desirability of recycling market. Furthermore,
in conducting the monitoring, the critical information that is related to the policy shift is sˆ, which can be
obtained by a simple market-based criteria: When B0(0) > 0, the subsidy level s exceeds the price for the
recycling market if and only if s > sˆ. See Ino (2011) in detail.
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¯d > s¯ + A(s¯).
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have identified the second-best deposit-refund policy when there is a
possibility that a firm dumps acquired recyclable wastes illegally, especially focusing on
the case of low-valued recyclable wastes whose reprocessing itself does not pay financially.
As a main result, we found that the structure of the second-best policy is qualitatively
dierent from the one obtained for a case where the recycled material commands a positive
net value as is investigated in Ino (2011).
When the social costs associated with its disposal are suciently significant, even a
fairly low-valued recycling activity can potentially improve the social welfare, which calls
for the creation of a residual waste market through some policy measures. However, the
mere creation of the market via the subsidy scheme can lead to an enormous amount of
illicit disposal by the firm which is supposed to be engaged in reprocessing, due to the
negative financial incentive of such an activity. As a result, substantial monitoring ef-
forts by the authorities may become necessary to deter illegal dumping by the firm as the
illicitly-dumped wastes are typically more socially-costly than the municipal processing
of legally-disposed wastes by the household. Thus, the desirability of the existence of the
recycling market critically hinges on the relative magnitudes of the monitoring cost ex-
pended by the authorities and the social cost of legally-disposed wastes by the household.
One major issue in implementing the second-best deposit-refund policy for a low-
valued recyclable product is that the information only available in the waste market is
critical in finding the level of the refund, i.e., the subsidy provided in that market. How-
ever, the creation of the proper recycling market could require substantial monitoring ac-
tivities as was stressed in the last part of the previous section. This could stifle an eort
to extract such information from the market experimentally. Even when such a subsidy
level is identified, the authorities do not know the exact level of the marginal social cost
of the household above which the subsidy should be provided. These issues do not occur
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if the recycled material has a positive net value, which justifies a simple use of a mod-
ified deposit-refund scheme as is elaborated in Ino (2011). This informational diculty
can pose a great challenge in encouraging the recycling of low-value recyclables through
policy actions even though the recycling itself is potentially desirable from the society’s
viewpoint.
As the empirical work by Kinnaman et al. (2014) suggests, the over-encouragement
of recycling activities are likely to be prevalent phenomena in many developed nations.
Such a finding can be related to the information diculty in implementing the second-best
policy set, which we have discussed in this paper. In the case of low-valued recyclables,
the government can be quite clueless about the threshold social cost of household waste
disposal and also about the optimal subsidy level, both of which are crucial in implement-
ing the second best policy set. Policies chosen by such an ill-informed government can
lead to substantial illegal waste disposal by firms or to an exorbitant monitoring cost if
the government wishes to contain them ex post without creating proper recycling markets.
This informational issue is unique to low-valued recyclables and can be a big obstacle in
achieving the welfare-maximizing outcome.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. This proof is applicable to both case (i) and case (ii) above. Let the given policy
set (t; s;  f ; h) = (t0; s0; 0f ; 0h) and suppose that zf (t0; s0; 0f ; 0h) = z0f > 0. We now alter
the levels of policy instruments. We depict the starting states in Figure 1. In these states,
the following must be satisfied: Pr(rˆ(0f ); 0h) < s0   0f and rc = rˆ(0f ). Reset s = s0  
f(s0   0f )   Pr(rˆ(0f ); 0h)g and, therefore, s   0f = Pr(rˆ(0f ); 0h). Then, we have z f = 0 and
still, rc = rˆ(0f ). Thus, r =  z0f , where  represents the dierence between the starting
state and the state after the alteration of the policy. Since s does not aect the supply
and demand of the product,  r = z since z = xd   rs. In other words, all the firms’
illegally disposed residual wastes are converted into the household’s legal waste. Thus,
W = (d f   d)z0f +Cr(z0f + rˆ(0f ))  Cr(rˆ(0f )) > 0. Note that, because the monitoring level
on the firm is unchanged, the monitoring cost is unchanged as well. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Suppose that a set of optimal policies is given by (t; s; h) = (t0; s0; 0h) and 0h > 0.
Note that, under the optimal policy set, we have  f = ˆ f (s0; 0h), and thus zf = 0. Then, the
equilibrium outcomes under this policy set are (x; r; z) = (x(t0; 0h); r(s0; 0h); x(t0; 0h)  
r(s0; 0h)). Consider the case where the authorities reset the policy (t; s; h) = (t0 + 0h; s0 +
0h; 0) under the optimal monitoring rule  f = ˆ f (s0+0h; 0). Then, the equilibrium outcomes
in this case are exactly the same as those before the alteration; that is, x(t0; 0h) = x(t0 +
0h; 0) and r(s0; 0h) = r(s0 + 0h; 0) and, thus, the equilibrium amount of the legal disposal
by the household, z = x   r, is also unchanged. This is because the supply curves
for the product and recycling markets both shift up by 0h and simultaneously the demand
curves for the product and recycling markets both shift up by 0h. Furthermore, we have
Pr(s0+0h; 0) Pr(s0; 0h) = 0h. This implies that ˆ f (s0; 0h) = ˆ f (s0+0h; 0) by the definition of
the optimal monitoring rule. Since only the monitoring cost for the household is changed
and all the other things are constant after the alteration of the policy set, W(t0 + 0h; s0 +
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0h; 0) W(t0; s0; 0h) =  h(0h)  h(0). Since  h(0h) >  h(0) when 0h > 0, this policy change
leads to the saving in the monitoring cost on the household. This poses a contradiction to
the claim that (t0; s0; 0h) are optimal. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The first-order conditions of the problem (19) with respect to t is
@W(t; s)
@t
= U0
@x
@t
 Cx0@x

@t
  d@x

@t
= 0: (20)
Plugging the first-order conditions, (3) and (10), obtained for the product market into (20)
and solving the equation with respect to t, we get t = d. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. In the first case, we have r(s; 0) > 0, or equivalently, s > C0r(0)   B0(0), under the
optimal policy set. When s > C0r(0)   B0(0)  C0r(0), ˆ f (s) = s   Pr(s; 0) > 0 holds by
Lemma 2. Therefore, in the first case, the first-order condition of the problem (19) with
respect to s becomes:
@W(t; s)
@s
= B0
@r
@s
 C0r
@r
@s
+ d@r

@s
   0f
"
1   @P

r
@s
#
= 0: (21)
Plug the first-order conditions for the residual waste market, (4) and (17), into (21) and
solve the equation with respect to s, making use of the following comparative statics results
derived from (4) and (17):
@Pr
@s
=
Cr00(r)
Cr00(r)   B00(r) > 0; (22)
@r
@s
=
1
Cr00(r)   B00(r) > 0: (23)
and, we eventually obtain s = sM in the proposition. In the second case, we have r(s; 0) =
0, or equivalently, s  C0r(0) B0(0), under the optimal policy set. When s  C0r(0) B0(0),
W(d; s) is decreasing in s if s > C0r(0) since r(s; 0) = 0 and ˆ f (s) = s   Cr(0) > 0;
W(d; s) is constant in s if s  C0r(0) since r(s; 0) = 0 and ˆ f (s) = 0. Therefore, in the
second case, the optimal subsidy level is any s such that satisfies s  C0r(0). Q.E.D.
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